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Part II of Anatomy of Georgia's Anti-Revolution will appear on Friday, January 4, 2008

Globalist Analysis > Global Politics
Anatomy of Georgia's Anti-Revolution (Part 1)
 

By Ana Dolidze and Irakli Jibladze | Thursday, January 03, 2008
 

Market reforms and a Western orientation do not necessarily produce democracy. Georgia — an ex-Soviet country turned “beacon of democracy” — showed just how quickly the promise of democracy can be shattered. In this two-part essay, authors Ana Dolidze and Irakli Jibladze explain how former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili transformed his promises of progress into a legacy of repression.


our years ago, demonstrations led to a peaceful change of regime in Georgia. This event became known as the Rose Revolution — a success story of democracy’s triumph over authoritarianism. Recent political turmoil, however, suggests that Georgia has been heading in the wrong direction for some time now.

In 2003, opposition leader Mikheil Saakashvili was catapulted into power though a series of mass rallies triggered by rigged parliamentary elections.

Virtually overnight, Saakashvili acquired the image of a young reformer poised to turn his backward country into a democratic model for the nearby authoritarian regimes. The United States welcomed the regime change in Georgia, which inspired similar “revolutions” in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.

Under Saakashvili, Georgia has seen double-digit economic growth, a threefold increase in GDP and a substantial improvement in infrastructure. More importantly, although it had teetered on the brink
Georgia’s is a story of how democracy gradually faded into a myth — with rising levels of abuse of power.
of becoming a failed state, Georgia reemerged on the world stage with vigor and aspirations of joining NATO and the EU.

The changes over the last four years have been noticeable. After years of darkness and cold, gas and electricity are no longer special treats. Traffic policemen do not extort money for their midday mug of beer — and it is not easy anymore to buy $5 shortcuts through bureaucratic hurdles.

The twice-defeated Georgian army — once famished and under-stocked with Soviet leftovers — is now working towards meeting NATO standards. Roads are being built, construction is booming and Georgia’s banking sector is slowly gaining confidence at the international level.

However, it is not these changes that pushed Georgians to go out in the streets of Tbilisi once again in November 2007. Rather, it is a story of how democracy gradually faded into a myth, with rising levels of abuse of power, breakdown of communication with the people and intolerance of diverse opinions.

Critics maintain that the absence of an independent judiciary, attacks on free media, mismanagement of state funds and widespread cronyism, to name a few, have accompanied Saakashvili’s consolidation of power all along. Others argue that the country’s economic success has yet to benefit the majority of its population.

Here’s a quick recap of key events along the way: Within days of being inaugurated,
Virtually overnight, Saakashvili acquired the image of a young reformer poised to turn his backward country into a model democracy.
Saakashvili proposed amendments to the constitution that he said would make the Georgian Parliament “the most powerful parliament in Europe.”

The amendments were approved within days, without much public debate, and arguably made Saakashvili “the most powerful president in Europe.”

The trends within the judiciary and media have also been alarming. According to Freedom House, of all criminal cases in 2006, there were 16,911 convictions and only 37 acquittals — putting the odds of proving one’s innocence at 0.2%.

Saakashvili’s zero-tolerance policies on crime and the abolition of conditional sentencing means the number of prisoners has tripled. As a result, jails are overcrowded, and inmates are forced to share beds.

In addition, a number of independent mass media outlets, most notably the spearhead of the Rose Revolution, Rustavi 2, have come under increasing pressure from the authorities and now rarely report unpopular news.

State funds are another concern. Georgia’s military budget will amount to 22% of government spending and to more than 7% of GDP in 2007. Repeated calls for budget transparency have been brushed off by the authorities who insist on keeping the information secret.

With unemployment now reaching 20%, an opposition party recently claimed that as much as half the population might need some sort of welfare or financial assistance intended for the poor.

After a year of silence, a former influential
An opposition party recently claimed that as much as half the population might need some sort of welfare or financial assistance intended for the poor.
member of Saakashvili’s cabinet, Irakli Okruashvili, returned into politics with a loud bang.

Okruashvili accused Saakashvili of corruption, as well as plotting the murder of out-of-favor Georgian tycoon Badri Patarkatsishvili. That accusation cast more doubt on the official cause of death of the late Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania.

On September 27, two days after making the allegations, Okruashvili was arrested under the pretext of mismanaging state funds during his tenure as the defense minister more than a year earlier.

The scandal prompted the fragmented opposition to unite with a demand to call for snap parliamentary elections. On November 2, the opposition managed to bring more than 100,000 people into Tbilisi center — exceeding the turnout of the Rose Revolution four years earlier.

On the fifth day of the rallies, November 7, riot police violently dispersed demonstrators with teargas, water cannons and rubber truncheons.

Photographs and videos showed policemen chasing down fleeing citizens — beating them or firing rubber bullets. Some 508 people needed urgent medical care, and 21 were arrested.

Leading members of the ruling party later explained the crackdown was necessary to ensure traffic flow in the central part of the capital.

Following the demonstrations, SWAT teams stormed independent TV channel Imedi, shutting down its broadcast, damaging its equipment and confiscating most of its materials. Imedi TV
Riot police violently dispersed demonstrators with teargas, water cannons and rubber truncheons.
— owned by Badri Patarkatsishvili and Rupert Murdoch’s Newscorp — was a popular channel, and one of the few outside government control.

With the Imedi TV incident, authorities apparently realized that a “traffic flow” argument would not suffice. Instead, Saakashvili addressed the nation and spoke of the need to counter a coup attempt from Russia.

Tbilisi City Court later suspended Imedi TV’s broadcast license, claiming the station posed “an obvious and real threat of a forceful overthrow of the government.” In keeping with this allegation, Badri Patarkatsishvili was charged with conspiracy to overthrow the government.

Beginning the evening of the crackdown, a 15-day state of emergency was imposed that restricted the freedom of assembly and banned “receipt and dissemination of information by media sources in written, verbal and any other form.”

In the televised address the next day, Saakashvili announced early presidential elections on January 5, 2008, and a plebiscite on whether parliamentary elections should be conducted in spring or fall.

Editor's Note: Part II of this essay will be published on The Globalist tomorrow.




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