Log In  |  Register Now  
 Home | Syndication Services | Media Features | Research Center | Archive | Contributors | About Us

To receive our weekly e-newsletter containing headlines and highlights from The Globalist, sign up here.



Topic

Companies

Culture

Development

Diplomacy

Economy

Environment

Finance

Health

History

Markets

Media

Music

Politics

Religion

Security

Sports

Technology

Women

Youth


Region

Africa

Asia-Pacific

Europe

Latin America

Middle East

North America


Globalist Bookshelf

Best Books of 2009

Best Books of 2008


Editorial Staff

Contributors

Jobs & Internships


Subscribers to The Globalist's premium services can log in here:

Username:

Password:

Forgot your password?




 

Dr. Akbar Ahmed has written a unique account of Waziristan, Resistance and Control in Pakistan (2004), based on his field experience there.

Globalist Interview > Global Security
U.S. Covert Action in Waziristan (Part I)
 

By Akbar Ahmed | Wednesday, January 23, 2008
 

The global spotlight is on Waziristan. Osama bin Laden is said to be there, as well as a new generation of Al Qaeda leaders. Worried about the destabilizing effect of Al Qaeda, the U.S. government wants the CIA to conduct more aggressive operations there. American University Professor Akbar Ahmed, a former civil service administrator once in charge of Waziristan, told The Globalist what the United States can expect.


How do you view the U.S. plan to step up its covert activities in Waziristan?

Waziristan has been invaded by empire after empire, and was never subjugated.
Akbar Ahmed (AA): I hear about plans for U.S. air strikes and special operations and I am speechless. Hasn’t the Bush Administration learned anything from history? Don’t U.S. policymakers read anything at all? It seems they don’t have any memory at all.

What should be the U.S. goal in Waziristan?

AA: The key for the United States in dealing with Waziristan is to work through the government of Pakistan to pacify or calm the tribes, get hold of Osama, if indeed he is there, and to make the tribes respond positively to them. The Pakistani government hasn’t succeeded in that.

What makes this situation so tricky?

But the Americans just walked away. That was the fatal error. When the United States walked away they left a vacuum. The warlords came back.
AA: The people of Waziristan feel that they are the toughest, the noblest, the bravest of the very brave and noble people, the Pashtuns. Their self esteem is very high. They are not intimidated by anyone.

Throughout history, Waziristan has been invaded by empire after empire, and was never subjugated. With that history in mind, the Wazir and Mahsud tribes are very confident.

What is the legacy of American involvement there?

AA: After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the tribal peoples and the peoples of the region — not just the tribal peoples — thought the United States and the Americans were fast friends; and they, together with the Americans, faced a common foe that was the Soviet Union.

These people have a great sense of local democracy and fair play. They felt that the Soviet invasion had to be resisted.
They are simple people. They saw Americans as god-fearing — and the Soviets as godless. And they saw the Soviet Union as a bully, a superpower that had charged into Afghanistan and was raping, looting and killing people.

Remember, these people have a great sense of local democracy and fair play. They felt that this invasion had to be resisted. So the tribal areas were enthusiastically sympathetic to the Afghans — not just because they are ethnically akin to the Afghans. In the 1980s, the Americans were popular with the local people.

Did you feel that U.S. intelligence officials at the time understood the people and culture of Waziristan?

AA: Not really. The area was off limits to them and they had no access. It remained a mystery.

What reputation did the CIA and Americans have in Waziristan after the Soviets were expelled?

AA: Initially, Americans had a good reputation. After all, it was because of the Americans, especially the CIA, that the Afghans won the war in Afghanistan. The CIA, working with the Pakistani intelligence, was able to provide weapons to the Afghans and especially the “Stingers” to shoot down the Soviet helicopters. Afghans remember that Ronald Reagan had called them ‘freedom fighters.’
The people of Waziristan feel that they are the toughest, the noblest, the bravest of the very brave and noble people, the Pashtuns. They are not intimidated by anyone.

But not long afterwards, Afghans looked at their land and said, ‘My god, look at the devastation, we are destroyed, our homes are destroyed. One-fourth of our people have lost a limb or a leg because of the Soviet’s brutalities. Our homes have been uprooted; there is starvation in parts of Afghanistan.’ And they thought, ‘our American friends will help us.’

But the Americans just walked away. That was the fatal error. When the United States walked away they left a vacuum. The warlords came back, along with local rivalries — and this time the king of Afghanistan was no longer there to act as a unifying force. It was just an implosion of society. In that vacuum, we saw the emergence of the Taliban. In that anarchy and chaos, emerged Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda and the stage was set for 9/11.

Editors Note: This interview was conducted on January 6, 2008 by Nathan Richter as part of the St. Andrew’s American Century Oral History Project.

You can read Part II here.


Let us know what you think ...
 

 

 

 

You must be a registered user of our site to send us your comments. If you have already registered, please log in. If you a new user of our site, please register now. Registration is quick, easy and completely free.

   

Complete the below to send a letter to the editor about this article.

   
Name  
 
Email Address  
 
City and State  
 
Country  
 
Comments  
 

 
Please note: If we publish your comment on The Globalist, we will identify only your name, city and country. We do not publish anonymous comments. Your email address will not be published.

We regret that we cannot publish every comment we receive. Furthermore, because we review each comment before it is published, there may be a delay between the time you send your comment and its appearance on our site. The Globalist reserves the right to edit comments for style and length.

Copyright © 2000-2010 by The Globalist. Reproduction of content on this site without The Globalist's written permission is strictly prohibited. Terms of Use | Privacy Policy

The Globalist claims full trademark rights to The Globalist name and logos.

McPherson Square, 927 15th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20005
The Globalist