sians’ newfound sense of confidence stems from three factors, all of which are ultimately rooted in the power of comparisons.

No, it is not that Asian elites have become delusional or merely giddy. They know that there are still masses of people living in poverty, despite the gains made on this front, especially by China.

The biggest lesson from the faltering West from an Asian perspective? Whatever you do, never over-promise to your own people.

They also feel the pressure of a massive youth wave, which focuses political leaders on ensuring economies are successful enough to accommodate new labor market entrants — so as not to create a backlash among those who fail to find work.

And, sure enough, pent-up demand, the urbanization wave and the emergence of a rising and prosperous middle class are all positive economic growth vectors that make Asians confident about their ability to generate sufficient GDP growth.

Of course, Asia's leaders know that this is a double-edged sword, since it also creates enormous new challenges, particularly in terms of environmental management.

Why then the profound optimism in such a large array of countries that are not naturally predisposed toward optimism?

There are three reasons. The first is the number 441. This figure represents the average debt-to-GDP ratio of the G7 nations that would prevail by 2050 under current policies. That is up from about 70% in 2007, prior to the onset of the global economic crisis.

Nothing describes the impending shift of global economic fortunes more succinctly — and more harshly. For this is not just a number, but an economic reality that, in retrospect, makes decades of pain experienced by developing countries in dealing with over-indebtedness seem not so terrible after all.

When the world's (soon to be formerly?) leading economies are on track to compile debt nearly 4.5 times their annual GDP, it makes Asia's mountain of problems appear that much more manageable, which further inspires confidence in the future.

What unites much of dynamic Asia today is a collective and rigorous willingness to learn and to improve.

Politicians, mind you, are keenly aware of how much easier it is to manage a population that, by and large, feels in ascendance, compared to one that has a nagging sense of standstill, or of being on the road toward decline.

In societies in the midst of a perceived decline, the reform process becomes overwhelmed by negative sentiments as forces defending the status quo organize themselves vigorously to block the necessary reforms.

And as tough as it was for developing countries that took on too much debt in decades past, not only has the issue largely been worked out by now, it also forced them to pursue policies that would allow for sustainable economic progress in the future.

That makes the collective experience of the Asian financial crisis the second reason for Asia's new-found confidence. As bad as things were for many countries in the region back in 1997/98, the current "global" (i.e., by now largely Western) crisis has done more than just prove that Asia has not been affected.

While the jury is still out on whether Europe can live up to Rahm Emanuel’s dictum to never let a crisis go to waste (and while it is entirely doubtful that the United States can do so), Asia has evidently embraced the former White House Chief of Staff's challenge, with a decade-long track record to prove it.

The third reason for the strong sense of confidence in much of Asia is that it is building dynamically on the experience garnered during the recent phase of economic and financial crisis management. In fact, the full potential for pan-Asian cooperation has barely been scratched.

This does not refer to any pie-in-the-sky sentiment of grand bargains between big Asian powers. Rather, it addresses the many benefits still to be reaped from a deepening of further policy coordination on very specific matters, as Zeti Akhtar Aziz, the head of Malaysia’s central bank, made plain at the recent IMF annual meeting.

The precautionary principle, widely considered a hallmark of European policy management, applies at least as much to Asian preferences.

In response to the financial shock that gripped much of Southeast Asia just over a decade ago, she explained, the ASEAN nations have been on the forefront of assembling teams in the region based in finance ministries and central banks. These teams now collaborate on a daily basis to monitor critical events, such as capital flows and other market developments, in real time.

The reason for all this? The crisis of 1997/98 was so potent that any repeat of the failure to articulate problems in the financial markets as early as possible is widely viewed as potentially tragic, and therefore unacceptable.

Reliance on external resources — whether the early warning mechanisms of the IMF, World Bank, the rating agencies, or worse, one's financial intermediaries, such as investment banks — had proven wholly insufficient.

Building up internal capacities for proper risk monitoring at the intersection of the domestic, regional and global economy, borne out of the necessity of responding to a very real crisis, was the only logical consequence.

That step is also having another major benefit: helping the cause of the ASEAN countries in Asia at large. These countries had long been considered “wannabes” or even nuisances, not able to integrate or punch in the proper weight category.

But in the aftermath of the 1997/98 crisis, they have taken on the same constructive role that the Benelux countries did 50 years ago in the foundational stages of the European Community. They provide the policy glue and ideas that help the "biggies" overcome their mutual prejudices.

In this emerging new world, it will be interesting to observe how the ASEAN nations will seek to advance global agreements.

If Asians are committed to one thing regarding global coordination, then it is a rigorous embrace of the best practices principle.

Many top Asian policymakers today spent the formative periods of their professional training in the United States. And while that country has long led the process of global policy coordination, there are very real questions as to whether it is in a domestic position to do so much longer.

The future "global game" will likely depend more on employing a variation of the uniquely Bush II principle of global politics (alliances of the willing) — only that these alliances will now be based on actual willingness.

If Asians are committed to one thing regarding global coordination, then it is a rigorous embrace of the best practices principle. The old default position — father (aka, the United States) always knows best — has become untenable.

But the trouble with the best practices idea is that none is clearly established in the global finance and economics domain, since they deal with quite a few unknowns, if not unknowables.

But in that complexity-laden world, it comes down to essentially two choices: going all-in, American-style, or applying the precautionary principle, widely considered a hallmark of European policy management. The latter, of course, is a misnomer, as it applies at least as much to Asian preferences.

This joint preference would, in principle, augur well for the Europeans' role in global affairs. But they would be well-advised not to rest on their laurels.

What unites much of dynamic Asia today is a collective and rigorous willingness to learn and to improve — the Toyota principle of the continuous improvement process writ large.

The future "global game" will likely depend more on employing a variation of the uniquely Bush II principle of global politics (alliances of the willing).

And while there is much to learn from Europe, especially on the art and mechanisms of consensus-oriented management among independent nations, the collective sense in Asia is that this is Asia's time.

The developed world’s “441” challenge firmly rooted in their mind, they have all the incentives and useful warning signs to get the process of managing Asia's — and their individual countries’ — economic future right.

The biggest lesson for the faltering West from an Asian perspective? Whatever you do, never over-promise to your own people. Never become locked into long-term payment schemes you cannot afford.

And preserve the spirit of personal self-reliance that is widely imbued in most of Asia as an economic necessity while traveling the path toward much wider-spread wealth creation.