The Latest Crisis in Pakistan
How has President Musharraf’s declaration of emergency in Pakistan generated a crisis with serious global implications?
November 5, 2007
Pakistan to this day remains — along with Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey, Iran and Bangladesh — one of the few Muslim states where democratic processes have taken root over the years.
Even when Pakistan is governed by military dictators — as it is frequently (1958-70, 1978-88, 1999-present) — it is still able to sustain a free press, active political parties and an independent judiciary.
Its ability to retain liberal political institutions even under military dictatorship is an important characteristic that we must keep in mind as we watch the current spiraling sequence of political disasters in Pakistan.
Some political theorists talk of illiberal democracies: polities where there are elections but often in the absence of other important democratic institutions such as free speech, free media and an independent judiciary. Pakistan is in a curious way the opposite of an illiberal democracy. It is a liberal dictatorship.
The declaration of emergency by General-President Musharraf in Pakistan on November 3 is essentially an attempt to pull a coup against an important liberal dimension of Pakistan — the independent judiciary.
In October, General-President Musharraf won the presidential elections while holding on to the position of the Chief of Pakistan’s military. But according to the current Pakistani constitution, government employees cannot run for elections and therefore Musharraf cannot hold his position as the head of the military and still be eligible to run for political office.
His election was challenged in the Supreme Court, and right before the court was to give its decision on the constitutionality of Musharraf’s election as President of Pakistan, he has declared emergency, laid siege to the Supreme Court, blacked out independent news media and detained those who had moved the Supreme Court to test the legality of his election.
This last year has seen Musharraf move against two institutions — the judiciary and the media — which otherwise have enjoyed a relatively free reign under a dictatorship. These moves are clearly indications that Musharraf feels insecure about his grip on power as his popularity declines.
In the last year, Musharraf’s popularity has diminished both in Washington and in Pakistan. This is primarily because he has become less and less useful both at home and abroad.
In Pakistan, he has failed to curb the extremist violence which has taken over 450 lives. The military campaigns in the tribal areas against Taliban supporters and against the Red Mosque and the adjunct seminary in Islamabad has generated unprecedented amounts of resentment and anger against Musharraf.
He is seen by his critics now primarily as a Washington tool who does nothing except help the United States fight its war against terror, which most people in Pakistan view as a war against Islam. Musharraf is waging wars against his own people in cities and provinces, and that has made the citizenry as well as the military nervous and unhappy.
Musharraf brought a degree of stability to society and gave impetus to its declining economy after the coup in 1999. His alliance with the Bush administration after September 11, 2001, also brought billions of dollars worth of military and economic aid to Pakistan, and the economy has definitely benefited from this.
He has also provided, thanks to the professionalism of the military, both efficient and corruption-free governance. Pakistan’s military is one of the few professional, competent and stable institutions in the country, and it essentially assumed the responsibilities of the state after 1999 — and things got better.
The Pakistani population, however, has gotten used to the positive changes, forgotten the corruption and chaos under the previous democratic governments from 1988-1998, and now is dissatisfied with the turmoil that Musharraf’s desperate efforts to retain power are bringing to Pakistan.
Even some of the secular elite who have supported Musharraf’s undemocratic ways are becoming wary of his high-handedness.
They appreciated his enlightened approach to Islam and saw him as a force that, while subverting democracy minimally — only at the top, since the rest of Pakistan’s governments, local and national, were elected — nurtured a degree of secularism and religious freedom necessary against the rising tide of Taliban-style Islamism.
But what they have finally ended up with is more Islamic militancy with extremist violence and less and less democracy.
Since September 11, 2001, Pakistan essentially became the frontline state against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and America’s major ally in the so-called war on terror. Musharraf’s coup in 1999 was described by many analysts as a coup against Washington, since the-then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was seen as too close to Washington and President Clinton.
Until 2001, Musharraf was a persona non grata in Western capitals, but since then he has become the face of enlightened Islam and Muslim cooperation in America’s war against Islamic extremism.
Musharraf was seen as the go-to guy in eliminating Al Qaeda from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and as the bulwark that kept the extremists from taking over Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal.
In return, the United States provided military and economic aid and did not pressure him to restore democracy in Pakistan. When two of the four provinces in Pakistan fell to Islamist-leaning parties in state assembly elections, the dangers of instant democracy became easily apparent to Washington.
But lately there are rumblings in Washington. General Musharraf has not fully succeeded in suppressing Islamic militancy: Al Qaeda (according to the National Intelligence Council) has reconstituted itself to pre-September 11 strength, and the Taliban continues to wage its war against Western forces in Afghanistan from bases in Pakistan.
Muslims of Pakistani origin are also seen as the main source for recruitment by radical groups in Britain. Pakistan has steadily become the most critical state for American and western security — and given the fact that it is a nuclear-armed state — the strategic significance of a state failure or collapse in Pakistan is greatly heightened.
In recent weeks, Washington has been facilitating a rapprochement with Benazir Bhutto that could enable Musharraf to make a transition to democracy, and, with Bhutto as prime minister, remain president and sustain a secular alliance of power in Islamabad.
The declaration of emergency by Musharraf is his second coup against Washington. It not only derails the latest effort to usher in democracy but also emboldens the Islamist opposition who recognize that by taking this aggressive step, the General himself has brought Pakistan to the tipping point. It remains to be seen if they can muster the capacity to go the distance.
Washington cannot and will not abandon Musharraf. Indeed his move, which brings Pakistan closer to collapse, basically forces Washington to stand behind him more firmly, albeit unhappily.
In the end, the current crisis can be diffused, if an early rapprochement between Musharraf and the Pakistani Supreme Court can be arranged. It is here that Benazir Bhutto can play a role and reestablish herself as a major player both at home and in the eyes of Washington.